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THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BACKDATING
OF EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONSt
M. P. Narayanan*
Cindy A. Schipani**
H. Nejat Seyhun ** *
This Article discusses the economic impact of legal, tax, disclosure, and
incentive issues arising from the revelation of dating games with regard to
executive option grant dates. It provides an estimate of the value loss in-
curred by shareholders offirms implicated in backdating and compares it
to the potential gain that executives might have obtained through backdat-
ing. Using a sample of firms that have already been implicated in
backdating, we find that the revelation of backdating results in an average
loss to shareholders of about 7%. This translates to about $400 million per
firm. By contrast, we estimate that the average potential gain from back-
dating to all executives in these firms is about $500,000 per firm annually.
We suggest some remedies not only for backdating, but also for other dubi-
ous practices such as springloading.
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INTRODUCTION
The burgeoning compensation packages of top executives of U.S. com-
panies have attracted considerable attention in the past few years.' Most of
the public attention has centered on compensation levels' while academics
have focused on the incentive effects of compensation.3 Shareholder activ-
ists have argued for years that compensation levels are high because top
executives have captured the compensation process and that it is no longer
an arms-length transaction between the board and the top executives.4 Al-
though academics have been slower to consider this point of view, there has
1. See Jill E. Fisch, The New Federal Regulation of Corporate Governance, 28 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 39, 46 (2004) (discussing how media attention has been focused on executive com-
pensation); see also Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the SEC Open
Meeting (July 26, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/206/spchO72606psa.htm (last visited Jan.
13, 2007) (demonstrating how executive compensation has received so much media attention that
the Commissioner was compelled to respond to public concems). For examples of news stories
covering executive compensation in the United States, see John Gray, How Much is Too Much?,
CAN. Bus., July 17-Aug. 13, 2006, at 55; Kathy Kristof, Bosses' Pensions Sure to Shock, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2006, at 20; and Terence O'Hara, Many Executives' Paychecks Swelled, No
Matter How They Did; Compensation Tended to Climb Sharply in Three-Year Period, WASH. POST,
July 10, 2006, at D07.
2. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 1, at 55 (expressing the opinion from a Canadian perspective
that executive compensation in the United States is excessively high); Kristof, supra note 1 (discuss-
ing the contribution of pensions to the compensation levels of executives); O'Hara, supra note I
(providing specific examples of U.S. executives who are receiving high levels of compensation);
Press Release, Sullivan, Cotter & Assoc., Total Compensation Up 7.2% According to 2006 Survey
of Manager & Executive Compensation in Hospitals and Health Systems, (Aug. 3, 2006),
http://www.sullivancotter.com/resources/news20060803.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (focusing
solely on the compensation data for executives in the health care industry).
3. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae:
A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage, 30 J. CORP. L. 807,
808 (2005) (providing a specific analysis of Fannie Mae's executive compensation arrangements
that reveals how the system weakened managers' incentives to enhance shareholder value); Qiang
Cheng & Terry D. Warfield, Equity Incentives and Earnings Management, 80 ACCT. REV. 441, 441
(2005) (hypothesizing that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to engage in earn-
ings management to increase the value of their shares to be sold); Eliezer M. Fich & Anil
Shivdasani, The Impact of Stock-Option Compensation for Outside Directors on Firm Value, 78 J.
Bus. L. 2229, 2230 (2005) (focusing on the effect of stock-option plans on the alignment of incen-
tives of outside directors along with those of shareholders).
4. See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN
EXECUTIVES (1991); ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 221-225
(3d. ed. 2004).
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been a spate of research in recent years that provides evidence inconsistent
with the arms-length model. 5
In this Article, we discuss the implications of one form of executive cap-
ture of the compensation process, namely, the practice of backdating
executive stock options. Evidence consistent with the practice of backdating
was first identified in 2005 by Professor Lie 6 and by Professors Narayanan
and Seyhun.' Although the media subsequently picked up the results of this
research and started reporting on the practice,8 it became a full-fledged
scandal when the Wall Street Journal published a report on its front page
suggesting that executives of six companies might have backdated their op-
tions. 9 Since then, there have been new revelations of backdating on a
regular basis. As of this writing, over one hundred companies have been
embroiled in backdating, with the Securities Exchange Commission
("SEC"), the Justice Department, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), and
several state attorneys general starting their own investigations.' ° It has also
triggered questions about the role of auditors in checking this practice.
Backdating is only one form of dating game that executives can play.
Backdating occurs when the executive (with or without the knowledge of
the board) designates as the options grant date some date before the date on
5. Bebchuk has been at the forefront of academics that question the arms-length model and
suggest that the compensation process has been captured by the executives being compensated (a
theory known as the Power hypothesis). For a detailed critique of the arms-length model and a syn-
thesis of the Power hypothesis, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). For evidence in support of the
Power hypothesis, see Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Agents With and Without Princi-
pals, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 203 (2000), and Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs
Rewarded for Luck? The Ones without Principals Are, 116 Q. J. ECON. 901 (2001). For a critique of
this hypothesis, see Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power
versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847 (2002).
6. Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCl. 802, 802 (2005).
7. M. P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do Managers Influence their Pay? Evidence from
Stock Price Reversals Around Executive Option Grants 2 (Ross Sch. of Bus. Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 927, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=649804 (last visited Jan. 24,
2007).
8. Judith Burns, UPDATE: New Study Finds Lingering Stock-Option Abuses, Dow JONES
NEWSWIRES, Jan. 27, 2006; Mark Hulbert, Test of Good Corporate Citizenship, MARKET WATCH,
Feb. 18, 2005, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/timing-managers-option-grants-
good/story.aspx?guid=%7BA2C5024B%2DDCBC%2D45 I D%2DBF61%2D0 17791 A7B2FB%7D
(last visited Jan. 6, 2007).
9. Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday-Some CEOs reap millions by
landing stock options when they are most valuable; Luck-or something else?, WALL ST. J., Mar.
18, 2006, at Al.
10. The Wall Street Journal maintains a list of companies on its website that are under inves-
tigation by the SEC and/or the Justice Department. See The Wall Street Journal Online, Perfect
Payday, Options Scorecard, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-
full.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Options Scorecard]. The U.S. Attorney for Northern
California brought criminal charges involving backdating against the former CEO and Human Re-
source Director of Brocade Communications in late July, 2006. Several state attorneys general,
notably of the states of Minnesota and Ohio, have started their own investigations. The New York
Times reported in late July 2006 that the IRS is reviewing companies implicated in backdating. Eric
Dash, I.R.S. Reviewing Companies in Options Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at C 1.
1599June 20071
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which the board in fact decided to grant options.' The executive does this to
obtain options at a lower exercise price because the board-designated exer-
cise price typically mirrors the stock price prevailing on the board-
designated grant date. 2 Thus, backdating is only worthwhile if the stock
price has been rising in the days before the board decision date. Although
backdating has received the most attention, other dating games are also pos-
sible. For example, if the stock price has been falling before the board's
decision date, executives can wait to see what the stock price does in the
near future before designating a grant date (backdating is clearly pointless).
If the stock price continues to fall, they can designate a future date as the
grant date. We term this practice forward-dating. 3
We argue in this Article that misdating of option grants has economic
implications resulting from legal, tax, disclosure, and incentive issues, all of
which are detrimental to shareholders. Specifically, we discuss four conse-
quences of misdating that can adversely impact shareholder value. (1) Legal
issues: There are legal consequences arising from backdating or forward-
dating without complete disclosure. In addition, the ethical issues raised
might have economic consequences as they undermine investors' confidence
in top executives. (2) Tax issues: The tax treatment of in-the-money options
is different than the tax treatment of at-the-money options with implications
for both the company and its executives. (3) Corporate disclosure issues:
Disclosure of misdating practices can lead to the restatement of earnings, as
the camouflaged pay is recognized as a compensation expense. The reduced
earnings can also result in a downward reassessment of shareholder value.
(4) Incentive issues: Misdating amounts to stealth compensation. If this is
done because executives have captured the compensation process, then the
managers are being inefficiently compensated, resulting in incorrect incen-
tives.
We discuss the economic impact of each of the above issues. We then
measure the economic impact of dating games on a list of firms that have
already been implicated or are under investigation for these practices. The
list of firms is taken from a website maintained by the Wall Street Journal.
4
11. Although it is the norm to set the board decision date as the grant date, we are aware of
no SEC regulation that requires it. Section 1.421 -1 of The Internal Revenue Code, however, requires
specification of the grant date. It states: "the date of the granting of the option" and "the time such
option is granted," and similar phrases refer to the date or time when the granting corporation com-
pletes the corporate action constituting an offer of stock for sale to an individual under the terms and
conditions of a statutory option. A corporate action constituting an offer of stock for sale is not
considered complete until the date on which the maximum number of shares that can be purchased
under the option and the minimum option price are fixed or determinable. I.R.C. § 1.421-1 (2004).
12. Options with the exercise price equal to the prevailing stock price are called at-the-
money options. If the exercise price is lower or greater than the stock price, the options are called,
respectively, in-the-money or out-of-the-money options.
13. See M.P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate
Option Grant Dates to Increase Their Compensation? (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=896164 (last visited Jan. 24, 2007) (identifying
forward-dating and finding evidence consistent with the practice).
14. See Options Scorecard, supra note 10.
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We find that firms on this list lost on average a market value of $389 million
per firm during a window of twenty-one days around the first announcement
that implicated a firm in backdating, either by the firm's own admission, or
because the SEC or the Justice Department had commenced an investiga-
tion.'5 We compare this figure to the average gain executives of these firms
might have achieved during 2000-2004 if they had backdated aggressively,
i.e., backdated on every grant date that backdating would have been profit-
able. We find that executives would have benefited by $500,000 per firm per
year at most by backdating during this period. 6 It appears that the potential
benefit to executives from clandestine backdating is miniscule compared to
the potential damage to shareholders.
We suggest some remedies to eliminate clandestine backdating and
other types of stock price manipulation influencing executive compensation.
It has been documented that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") 7 has
not been successful in fully eliminating clandestine backdating or other
forms of manipulation such as springloading, where managers manipulate
the timing of the release of information around the grant date." Recently the
SEC has voted to approve changes to reporting requirements that will elimi-
nate the dating games. 9 We discuss remedies to eliminate springloading as
well.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I provides an overview of the
dating games, namely backdating and forward-dating. Part II discusses the
four consequences of these dating games and their impact on shareholder
value. Part III measures the impact on the shareholder value of a list of firms
already implicated in dating games. Part IV suggests some remedies for lim-
iting the manipulation of executive compensation. The Conclusion
summarizes our findings and conclusions.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF BACKDATING AND FORWARD-DATING
In this section we provide a brief description of two types of dating
games, namely backdating and forward-dating, and the academic evidence
consistent with their prevalence before and after the enactment of SOX. We
conclude by describing the types of companies and executives that appear
more likely to backdate and the option-granting procedures that appear to
encourage backdating. Before we describe these games, it is important to
note that neither backdating nor forward-dating by itself is illegal, as long as
15. See infra Section I.D.
16. See infra Section I.D.
17. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of I1, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. 1112003)).
18. See M.P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Influenc-
ing of Executive Compensation (Mar. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=852964 (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
19. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.13,249.103-.105 (2006).
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it is duly authorized by the board, fully disclosed, and reported in keeping
with tax rules.
Dating games are best explained using simple examples. Suppose an ex-
ecutive is awarded options on April 15 by the board of directors when the
firm's stock price is $40. As is the practice with almost all awards, these
options are awarded at-the-money, meaning that the exercise price is set
equal to the stock price on the grant date, here $40. ° If the stock price at the
time of exercise exceeds the exercise price of $40, the payoff to this execu-
tive will be the difference between the stock price prevailing at the time of
exercise and the exercise price of $40.
Suppose the firm's stock price has been rising before the board decision
date. The executive sees an opportunity to increase her compensation and
declares that she received at-the-money options on March 15, when the
stock price of $30 was below $40, and files a Form 4 report with the SEC
stating that March 15 is the grant date.21 This is backdating. This declaration
automatically sets the exercise price equal to the stock price on March 15, or
$30. What the board intended was that the executive receive options on
April 15 with an exercise price of $40. What the executive declared was that
she received at-the-money options with an exercise price of $30 on March
15. The payoff to this executive now equals the stock price at the time of
exercise less the exercise price of $30 if the stock price ends up above $30 at
the time of exercise. By obtaining options at a lower exercise price than the
board intended, the executive received more compensation than intended by
tampering with corporate documents. Also, because the board decision was
really made on April 15, this executive received options that are $10 in-the-
money immediately.
Now consider a different scenario. As before, the board grants at-the-
money options on April 15 when the stock price is $40. Now, however,
suppose the stock price has been falling prior to the board decision date.
Backdating is clearly fruitless. The executive can play a different dating
game: forward-dating. The executive can wait to see what the stock price
does. If it continues to decline, the executive can wait to designate afu-
ture date as the grant date. Suppose the stock falls to $35 by April 25.
The executive declares that she received at-the-money options on April
25, at the exercise price of $35.
20. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 209 (2000). As Hall and Murphy note, 94% of the options are granted at-the-
money, and the remaining options are granted out-of-the money. Id. There are two possible reasons
for the absence of in-the-money options. First, prevailing Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB") rules require that the difference between the stock price and the exercise price of in-the-
money options be charged against earnings. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 123: ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION
paras. 11-15 (1995) [hereinafter ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION]. Second, in-the-
money options are not considered "performance-based compensation" under Section 162(m) of the
Internal Revenue Code and therefore are not deductible if an executive's total nonperformance-
based compensation exceeds $1 million a year. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000). We describe these issues
infra Sections II.B-C.
21. In this example, we implicitly assume that the executive is solely responsible for the
misdating. The basic idea remains the same even if the board is complicit in this practice.
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The essential difference between backdating and forward-dating is that
the manager-designated grant date is before the board decision date in the
case of the former while it is after the board decision date in the case of the
latter. The extent of backdating or forward-dating, i.e., the number of days
of misdating, involves a trade-off between the potential for additional com-
pensation and the risk of detection. Backdaters can seek a date prior to the
board date to obtain a lower exercise price at an increased risk of detection.
Similarly, forward-daters can watch as a stock price falls, and wait until it
reverses direction in order to maximize their payoff.
How were these dating games originally detected? It would be simple if
we knew the board decision date and the designated grant date. Although
data about the manager-designated grant dates are available from Form 4
filings with the SEC, board decision dates are not readily available to re-
22searchers.
Professors Narayanan and Seyhun were the first to propose a test relat-
ing reporting lags to stock price patterns around the grant date to overcome
this problem. 23 Because we know when the SEC received Form 4, we can
measure the time lag between the manager-designated grant date and the
report date. If executives are backdating, a longer reporting lag implies that,
on average, they were backdating aggressively, seeking a lower exercise
price. This in turn implies that the extent of stock price rise following the
manager-designated grant date will be positively correlated with the report-
24ing lag. This is precisely what Narayanan and Seyhun found. Using adataset of over 600,000 grants during the period of 1992-2002 (almost all of
22. The disclosure of changes in the equity holdings of beneficial owners (defined as direc-
tor, officer, or beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of equity securities) is
governed by Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 15
U.S.C.A. § 78p (2000). On August 27, 2002, in line with section 403 of SOX, the SEC amended the
disclosure rules for beneficial ownership reports to be filed under section 16(a). See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16a-3 (2006); Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Commission Approves Rules Implementing Provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Accelerating Periodic Filings, and Other Measures (Aug. 27, 2002) available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-128.htm. The filing requirements became effective on Au-
gust 29, 2002. Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,462 (proposed Sept. 3, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 259,
274). SOX has instituted two major changes regarding the disclosure of executive option grants.
First, it requires that most grants be reported within two business days following the execution date
of the transaction. Id. § 403. Second, it requires that practically all executive option grants be re-
ported on Form 4. See id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3 (2006). Effective June 30, 2003, Form 4 must be
filed electronically within the two-day deadline. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(k) (2006). Prior to SOX,
grants meeting certain requirements could be reported on Form 5 which had to be filed only within
forty-five days of the end of the company's fiscal year, while other grants had been reported on
Form 4 which had to be filed within the first ten days of the month following the month of the grant.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3 (2001).
23. Narayanan & Seyhun, supra note 7. Lie bases his conclusion that some executives might
be backdating entirely on comparing the pattern of raw and market-adjusted stock returns around the
grant dates. Lie, supra note 6. Heron and Lie use the more direct method proposed by Narayanan
and Seyhun, supra note 7, that utilizes the positive relationship between reporting lags and post-
grant stock returns. Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern
Around Executive Stock Option Grants? J. FIN. EcON. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=877889 (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
24. Narayanan & Seyhun, supra note 7, at 44-45.
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them pre-SOX), they found that post-grant returns increased with reporting
lags.2 5 In the follow-up study, using post-SOX data of over 638,000 grants,
Narayanan and Seyhun found a similar positive correlation."
Forward-dating is more difficult to detect. The reporting lag technique
cannot identify the prevalence of forward-dating as cleanly as it can detect
backdating for the following reason: when forward-dating, there is no built-
in lag since the executive waits for a date in the future and can always report
promptly when the date occurs.
Narayanan and Seyhun use a slightly different technique to provide evi-denc conistet wih . 27
dence consistent with forward-dating. Consider an executive engaged in
forward-dating who also wishes to report the grant promptly to avoid violat-
ing reporting regulations. After SOX, the executive needs to report within
two business days of the grant. This executive is forward-dating only be-
cause the stock price has been falling. If she is an aggressive forward-dater,
the executive will continue to observe the stock price until it reaches a
trough and starts reversing. If the reversal continues for two days, the execu-
tive designates the date prior to the day the stock price started reversing as
the grant date and reports the grant immediately, filing Form 4 electronically
the same day to meet SOX reporting requirements. This scenario gives rise
to a testable prediction that two-day reporting lags should be more likely
than zero or one-day reporting lags when the stock price is falling prior to
the designated grant date. A second prediction for the same sample of firms
is that stock price should be more likely to rise after the manager-designated
grant date. The presence of both trends is consistent with forward-dating,
and Narayanan and Seyhun observed both trends within this sample of
firms.
28
A related question that arises is the effect of SOX on dating games. The
SOX requirement that option grants must be reported within two business
days severely limits the extent of backdating by executives who want to
meet the requirement. However, Narayanan and Seyhun show that more
than 20% of the post-SOX grants are reported late and that about 10% are
reported over one month, or twenty-two business days, late. 29 This resultprovides prima facie evidence that backdating may still be going on after
25. Id.
26. Narayanan & Seyhun, supra note 13, at 37-45. The fact that stock prices generally rose
after the grant date has been well-known for about a decade. See David Yermack, Good Timing:
CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997). Notably, this
pattern of stock prices is consistent with manipulations other than the dating games described here.
For example, managers might release good news just after receiving a grant, or they might award
themselves grants just before releasing good news. We call these manipulations "timing." They are
also known as "springloading." For evidence of timing, see id. and David Aboody & Ron Kasznik,
CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON.
73 (2000). It is the relation between post-grant stock price rises and reporting lags that distinguishes
dating games such as backdating and forward-dating from timing or springloading. See Narayanan
& Seyhun, supra note 7, for more evidence distinguishing the dating games from timing.
27. Narayanan & Seyhun, supra note 13, at 45.
28. Id.
29. Narayanan & Seyhun, supra note 18, at 33-37.
1604 [Vol. 105:1597
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SOX. The evidence provided by Narayanan and Seyhun confirms this con-
jecture:3 the same paper shows that the thirty-day post-grant return was
3.4% before SOX but fell to 1.6% after SOX. SOX has reduced the practice,
as expected, but has not fully eliminated it.3
What types of companies and executives are likely to have benefited the
most from backdating? Narayanan and Seyhun found that large grants (more
than 100,000 options) that were reported more than a month late after SOX
had significantly greater returns after the grant date compared to the rest of
the sample. Thirty-day stock returns after grants of between 100,000 and
500,000 options were about 15% while the figure was about 25% for grants
of over 500,000 options.12 Such late-reported large awards were made dis-
proportionately by smaller firms: about 58% of the firms in this category
had market capitalization of less than $100 million and about 78% of them
had market capitalization of less than $500 million.
Another interesting statistic is the significantly lower number of late
grants which were scheduled grants (that is, grants that are scheduled in the
same month as previous year's grants). Although about 51% of the grants
were scheduled grants in the whole sample, Narayanan and Seyhun found
that in the late-reporting large-grant sample only 28% were scheduled
grants.33 When grants are scheduled during certain days of the year (the day
of the board meeting to ratify the annual report, for example), and these
days are public knowledge, the probability of backdating is likely to be
lower.
II. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BACKDATING
As indicated earlier, there are four channels through which backdating
can affect shareholder value: (1) legal issues; (2) tax issues; (3) financial
reporting or disclosure issues; and (4) incentive issues. In this section, we
briefly describe how backdating affects shareholder value through each of
these channels.
A. Legal Issues
The inclusion of stock options in executive compensation packages is
generally meant to align management's interests with the interests of the
company's shareholders. 4 This is accomplished by making the executive's





34. See Randall S. Kroszner, et al., Economic Organization and Competition Policy, 19
YALE J. ON REG. 541, 548 (2002); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of
Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 37 (2000).
35. Thomas & Martin, supra note 34, at 38.
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when option grants are backdated or forward-dated, investors are unaware
that the options granted are in-the-money. Thus, shareholders may be misled
into believing that management's interests are firmly aligned with theirs
through the compensation package, when in fact executives can receive ad-
ditional compensation without stock prices rising. Moreover, stock options
granted at-the-money may not require the company to incur expenses in the
36same way that in-the-money options do. As discussed in Section II.C be-
low, when a company grants discounted stock options it must record a
compensation expense. 37 Backdating and forward-dating are thus misleading
shareholders not only with respect to the amount of compensation being
granted to executives, but also with respect to the financial statements.
Without full disclosure and accounting of the practice, it is misleading to
certify the financial statements as compliant with Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles ("GAAP"). 5
This deception is no doubt contrary to the purposes of the securities
laws3 9 and the more recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act,40 but the courts have not yet
had the opportunity to rule on whether the practice of backdating is a viola-
tion of the securities laws. That opportunity is looming on the horizon,
however, with recent litigation pertaining to the legality of backdating filed
by both the SEC and private litigants.4'
Convincing arguments can be made that the practice of backdating and
forward-dating of options violates both federal securities law and state cor-
porate law. The recent actions filed by the SEC against the executives of
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.,42 and Comverse Technology, Inc.,43
36. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS No. 123: SHARE-BASED PAYMENT (revised 2004) [hereinafter SHARE-BASED PAYMENT]. For
reporting periods prior to June 15, 2005, the governing accounting standards and related opinion
were Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees, 25 OPINIONS OF THE ACCT. PRINCIPLES BOARD 467
(1972), and ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, supra note 20. See infra Section II.C
for further discussion of this issue.
37. See discussion infra Section H.C.
38. See infra Section II.C.
39. The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted "[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the char-
acter of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent
frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2000)).
40. Sarbanes-Oxley "will improve disclosure, impose tougher penalties, and better protect
investors in ... cases of fraud." Conference Report on H.R. 3863, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 107
CONG. REC. E1451 (daily ed. July 29, 2002) (statement of Hon. John H. Sununu).
41. As of July 27, 2006, it has been reported that eighty-four derivative actions and ten class
actions have been filed by private litigants in connection with backdating of options. Cary O'Reilly,
Option backdating spurs few lawsuits, SEATTLE TIMES, July 27, 2006, at C2. In addition, the SEC
has filed two civil lawsuits, and the U.S. Attorneys for the Northern District of California and the
Eastern District of New York have filed corresponding criminal charges in those cases.
42. Complaint, United States v. Reyes, No. 3-06-70450 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2006); Com-
plaint, SEC v. Reyes, No. 06-4435 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2006).
43. Complaint, SEC v. Alexander, No. 1:06-CV-03844 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006); Press Re-
lease, U.S. Department of Justice, Former Executives of Comverse Technology, Inc. Charged with
Backdating Millions of Stock Options and Creating a Secret Stock Options Slush Fund (Aug. 9,
2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nye/pr/2006/2006Aug09.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
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indicate the Commission's belief that the backdating practices have resulted
in violations of the securities laws."
In this Section, we argue that backdating and forward-dating practices,
to the extent intended to provide undisclosed compensation, violate section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344' and Rule l0b-546 promul-
gated thereunder, as well as state corporate laws regarding corporate
governance and fiduciary duties. Although we recognize that several other
provisions of the federal securities laws are also implicated,47 an exhaustive
review of the federal securities laws that might be violated is beyond the
scope of this Article. Instead, we seek to provide an overview of the section
10(b), Rule lOb-5, and state corporate law claims regarding fiduciary duties
as illustrative of the legal issues presented by backdating and forward-dating
practices.
1. Violation of Federal Securities Laws
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlaw-
ful for any person to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered .... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
44. Complaint, SEC v. Alexander, No. 1:06-CV-03844 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006); Complaint,
SEC v. Reyes, No. 06-4435 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2006). In addition, a final judgment was recently
entered in the case brought by the SEC against Leonard Goldner, the former Senior Vice President
and General Counsel of Symbol Technologies, Inc. Litigation Release No. 19,585, U.S. Sec. and
Exch. Comm'n, Former General Counsel of Symbol Technologies, Inc. Consents to Permanent
Injunctive Relief, Officer-and-Director Bar and Administrative Order Under Rule 102(E) (Mar. 2,
2006), http://www.sec.gov/litigation./itreleases/lrl9585.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). The SEC
complaint against Symbol Technologies, Goldner, and ten other former executives alleged that the
defendants entered into a fraudulent scheme to inflate financial performance. Among other things,
Goldner was alleged to have manipulated stock option exercise dates. Litigation Release No. 18,734,
U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Symbol Technologies, Inc. and 11 Former Symbol
Executives with Securities Fraud (June 3, 2004), http://www.sec.govlitigation/litreleases/
Ir18734.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2007). Goldner pled guilty in 2004 to criminal charges brought by
the U.S. Attorney's office, and on February 7, 2006, the U.S. District Court entered a final judgment
pursuant to a consent decree with the SEC prohibiting him from acting as an officer or director of a
public company. See Former General Counsel of Symbol Tech., Inc., Consents to Permanent Injunc-
tive Relief, Officer-and-Director Bar and Administrative Order Under Rule 102(E), supra.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2006).
47. We note, for example, that the complaint against the executives of Comverse Technology,
Inc., alleges violations of "Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)], Sections
10(b), 13(b)(5), 14(a) and 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b),
78m(b)(5), 78n(a) and 78p(a)] and Exchange Act Rules lOb-5, 13b2-1, 13b2-2, 14a-9 and 16a-3 [17
C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.13b2-1, 240.13b2-2, 240.14a-9 and 240.16a-3] thereunder." (internal
definitions omitted). Two defendants were also alleged to have violated Exchange Act Rule 13a-14
[17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14]. Complaint, SEC v. Alexander, No. 1:06-CV-03844 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9,
2006).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
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prescribe., 49 Rule lOb-5, promulgated pursuant to section 10(b), makes it
unlawful for any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities:
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.50
To establish a violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the SEC must
prove the following elements: "(1) a material misrepresentation, (2) connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security, (3) scienter, and (4) use of the
jurisdictional means."5' A misrepresentation or omission is material if there
is a substantial likelihood a reasonable investor would consider it important
in making an investment decision.52 The United States Supreme Court in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 3 adopting the language from its earlier decision TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 4 described the materiality standard as requiring
"a substantial likelihood that the disclosure ... would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of in-
formation made available."55 Furthermore, whether a misstatement or an
omitted fact is material "is generally considered a mixed question of law
and fact, and therefore uniquely within the province of the factfinder.
'56
To determine materiality, courts consider factors such as whether the
disclosure affected a change in stock price 7 and the percentage of earnings
or losses that were misstated. In 1999, the SEC released a Staff Accounting
Bulletin ("SAB 99") that rejected reliance on quantitative benchmarks to
determine materiality, stating that "misstatements are not immaterial simply
because they fall beneath a numerical threshold." 58 According to SAB 99,
materiality must be considered in light of all relevant considerations, includ-
49. Id. § 78j(a)(2)(b).
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
51. SEC v. C. Jones & Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (D. Colo. 2004). The SEC is not
required to show reliance or loss causation, as is required of a private plaintiff to bring an action
under Rule lOb-5. Those elements are elements of a private cause of action for damages. See SEC v.
Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 1993).
52. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
53. 485 U.S. 224.
54. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
55. Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 231-32.
56. SEC v. Todd, No. 03CV2230, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41182, at *13 (S.D. Cal. May 23,
2006).
57. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1424-25 (3d Cir. 1997).
58. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,150 (1999).
1608 [Vol. 105:1597
The Economic Impact of Backdating
ing qualitative factors such as whether the misstatement or omission was
deliberate or intentional5 9
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the SEC staff's approach
outlined in SAB 99 in Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co. The court ruled that
the district court erred in using a quantitative benchmark to measure materi-
ality.6' Other federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted similar context-
based approaches to measuring materiality.62 In addition, the Southern Dis-
trict of New York has held that "the misstated or omitted fact must have
been one that would have assumed actual significance in the reasonable
shareholder's decision-making process, [but] there is no requirement that
the fact would have been outcome determinative."63
Backdating and forward-dating of options appear by their nature to fall
within the current standards for material misrepresentation. There seems to
be a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the in-
formation regarding the dating of the options important when making an
investment decision. Executive compensation issues are currently at the
forefront of shareholder concerns. 64 In a student-run empirical study on
59. See id. at 45,152.
60. 228 F.3d 154, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[B]ecause SEC staff accounting bulletins 'consti-
tute a body of experience and informed judgment,' and SAB No. 99 is thoroughly reasoned and
consistent with existing law ... we find it persuasive guidance for evaluating the materiality of an
alleged misrepresentation.") (citation omitted).
61. Ganino, 228 F3d at 163-64.
62. E.g., SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir. 2004) ("The determination of
materiality 'requires delicate assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder' would draw
from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him .... ')(quoting TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450); No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust
Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting defendant's argument
for adoption of a bright-line "market reaction" rule to determine materiality, choosing instead to
conduct a "fact-specific inquiry"); Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding the
determination of materiality to be a "highly fact-dependent analysis").
63. RMED Int'l, Inc. v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 389, 399 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
64. "With more than 20,000 comments, and counting, it is now official that no issue in the 72
years of the Commission's history has generated such interest." Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S.
Sec. And Exch. Comm'n, Introductory Remarks at the SEC Open Meeting (July 26, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spchO72606cc.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (discussing the
new executive compensation rules proposed in January 2006, and adopted in July 2006). Richard
Grasso, the former chairman and chief executive of the New York Stock Exchange, was forced to
resign in 2003 in the wake of shareholder criticism after the details of his compensation package-
which included over $139 million in deferred compensation-were released. Gretchen Morgenson
& Landon Thomas Jr., Corporate Conduct: The Overview; Chairman Quits Stock Exchange in
Furor over Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, at Al. In mid-July, the largest book retailer in the
United States, Barnes & Noble, announced that shareholders recently initiated a lawsuit against the
company over option grants. Ted Allen, Tip of the Iceberg on Options?, GOVERNANCE WKLY., July
21, 2006, http://www.issproxy.com/governance/publications/2006archived/158.jsp (last visited Jan.
9, 2007); see also James E. Heard, Executive Compensation: Perspective of the Institutional Inves-
tor, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 749 (1995) (illustrating the author's perspective as president of
Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of
Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 1021, 1021 (1999) (discuss-
ing the increase in shareholder activism related to executive compensation); Developments in the
Law - Corporations and Society, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2169, 2205 (2004) ("Few issues in corporate
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shareholder proposals between 2000 and 2004, the authors noted that execu-
tive compensation proposals were the most common type of shareholder
proposals submitted. 6 Moreover, when backdating and forward-dating oc-
cur, the financial statements are not accurate, and tax laws may be violated.
66
If the practice later comes to light, the company may be required to restate
its financial statements and may be subject to various penalties.67
In one of the recent cases filed by the SEC alleging charges of backdat-
ing in violation of securities laws, Brocade Communication Systems, Inc.
was required to restate at least four years of financial statements. The finan-
cial impact included the following:
(1) [N]et loss for the 2004 fiscal year increased from $1.3 million to $32
million (i.e., net loss was understated by 95.9%); (2) net loss for fiscal year
2003 increased from $136 million to $146 million; (3) net income for fis-
cal year 2002 increased from $60 million to $126 million; and (4) income
68for fiscal years 1999 through 2001 declined by a total of $303 million.
Additionally, Brocade restated a Form 10-K dated November 2005 to in-
clude $0.9 million related to options grants between August 2003 and
November 2004.69 Even by very crude quantitative materiality benchmarks,
these amounts in misstated earnings would likely be material.70
The recent case filed against former executives of Comverse Technol-
ogy, Inc.7 appears even more egregious. In this case, the SEC alleges that
"former executives collectively realized millions of dollars of ill-gotten
compensation through the exercise of illegally backdated option grants and
the subsequent sale of Comverse common stock. 72 The executives purport-
edly went so far as to create a so-called "slush fund" of backdated options in
law capture the attention of the academy and the general public quite like executive compensa-
tion.").
65. Jason M. Loring & C. Keith Taylor, Empirical Study: Shareholder Activism: Directorial
Responses to Investors'Attempts to Change the Corporate Governance Landscape, 41 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 321, 328 (2006). The authors used data from The Corporate Library. "TCL gathers data
on over two thousand major American corporations listed in four common indexes. It tracks propos-
als that have been submitted to those companies and uses several sources to determine whether
those proposals have been implemented." Id. at 327.
66. See infra Section I.B for a discussion of the tax consequences of backdating.
67. In November of 2005, Analog Devices agreed to a $3 million civil penalty in relation to
an SEC investigation. Angelo G. Savino & Russell A. Witten, iming of Option Grants and Direc-
tors 'and Officers'Liability, 236 N.Y. L.J. 4 (2006).
68. Complaint at 9, SEC v. Reyes, No. 06-4435 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2006).
69. Id. 138.
70. Brocade's restatement of financial statements shaved twenty cents off previously re-
ported earnings per share figures. David Kravets, Brocade execs charged with backdating stock
options go to court, SILICONVALLEY.COM, Aug. 9, 2006, http://www.siliconvalley.com/nmld/
siliconvalley/business/colunmists/markschwanhausser/15231692.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2007).
71. Complaint, SEC v. Alexander, No. 1:06-CV-03844 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006).
72. Litigation Release No. 19,796, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Former
Comverse Technology, Inc.. CEO, CFO, and General Counsel in Stock Option Backdating Scheme
(Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2006/lr19796.htm (last visited Jan. 13,
2007).
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the names of fictitious employees, hidden from the company's auditors.
Once the option grants were approved by the board committee, it is alleged
that the backdated options were then used for recruiting and retention of key
employees.73 Moreover, the Wall Street Journal reports that the former chief
executive has fled the country in the wake of the SEC charges. 4
A counterargument to the materiality claim may be made in cases where
the backdating or forward-dating produced de minimis income for the ex-
ecutives, and thus had a minor effect on the financial statements. However,
even in such cases, the shareholders may very well consider the information
important when making an investment decision. It seems logical to conclude
that shareholders may lose faith in management who choose to compensate
themselves in such a hidden manner and that shareholders' investment deci-
sions may be thereby affected." Furthermore, the empirical evidence
presented below in Part III supports the conclusion that even an immaterial
16
effect on earnings may have a much greater effect on shareholder wealth.
We recognize that it may be possible in some circumstances for a com-
pany to engage inadvertently in backdating practices due to ministerial
errors in recording stock grant approval dates.77 If this is true, and if the fi-
nancial consequences of the error are indeed minimal, the particular
backdating event might be found to be immaterial. Without intent to de-
ceive, the materiality issue may well turn on the dollar amount of the
misstatement. Yet, it is also possible that the sloppiness of the record-
73. Id.
74. See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Dating Game-Stock-Options Criminal Charge:
Slush Fund and Fake Employees, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2006, at Al.
75. See infra Section lI.D. For example, managerial integrity was at issue in In re Franchard
Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964). In that case, the SEC considered whether to issue a stop order sus-
pending the validity of three registration statements of the Franchard Corporation (formerly the
Glickman corporation) for failure to disclose, among other things, the unauthorized withdrawals of
company funds by Louis J. Glickman, Franchard Corporation's controlling shareholder, president,
and chairman. Id. at 164-68. Although a stop order was not issued, the Commission found that
Franchard Corporation's disclosures were materially deficient. Id. at 185. In particular, the Commis-
sion rejected the contention that the withdrawals, aggregating to over $2 million, were immaterial
because they "never exceeded 1.5 percent of the gross book value of [the Franchard Corporation's]
assets." Id. at 171. That argument ignored "the significance to prospective investors of information
concerning Glickman's managerial ability and personal integrity." Id. These factors were particu-
larly important to investors because the Franchard Corporation had no operating history and
investors were primarily attracted to the company by Glickman's reputation. Id. The Commission
suggested that the integrity of management "is always a material factor" and Glickman's undis-
closed withdrawals were "germane to an evaluation of the integrity of his management." Id. at 172.
The same reasoning could presumably apply equally to a manager who accepts compensation which
is inflated through undisclosed backdating. Cf SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824,
830 (E.D. Wis. 1978) ("[T]he question of the integrity of management gives materiality to the mat-
ters the Commission claims should have been disclosed."). But cf Greenhouse v. MCG Capital
Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 659 (4th Cir. 2004).
76. See infra Part III.
77. The SEC is also mindful of the distinction between backdating that results from illegal
activities and backdating that results from ministerial, logistical delays and is taking care not to
lump together "the innocuous with the nefarious." Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. Exch.
Comm'n, Remarks at the SEC Open Meeting (July 26, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch072606psa.htm) (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).
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keeping practices leading to the error would be taken into account as a
qualitative factor considered when determining materiality. In any event,
controls should be put in place in the future to prevent these errors from oc-
curring. Regardless of intent, the financial statements are still misleading.
The second element of a 1Ob-5 claim requires that the fraud be in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities. To meet this requirement,
"[i]t is enough that the scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coin-
cide. 78 The courts have interpreted this element very broadly, holding that
"[lt]he misrepresentation need not be made with respect to a particular sales
transaction but should be applied generally. For instance, statements in press
releases, annual and quarterly reports, proxy statements and SEC filings
have been found to satisfy the 'in connection with' element because inves-
tors rely on such documents."7 9  Backdating options leads to
misrepresentations in financial statements, SEC filings, and potentially
proxy statements, all documents upon which investors rely when making
investment decisions. Thus, this element should be easily satisfied.
The third element of the lOb-5 claim is scienter. Scienter refers to the
state of mind of the defendant. To meet this requirement, the SEC must
prove that the defendant had "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud," 0 This element of a lOb-5 claim is often litigated.
The Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted varying standards for meeting
the requirement of scienter."' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is quite
stringent, requiring proof of intent or "deliberate recklessness" to establish a
lOb-5 claim.8" The Ninth Circuit extended the Supreme Court's definition of
scienter, a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or de-
fraud,' 83 by declaring that a showing of recklessness may establish scienter.4
The Ninth Circuit defines recklessness as follows:
78. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822 (2002).
79. SEC v. C. Jones & Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1381 (citing SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8
F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993)).
80. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976)).
81. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F3d 185, 188 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the sci-
enter standard included "a narrowly defined concept of recklessness which does not include
ordinary negligence, but is closer to being a lesser form of intent"); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,
187 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs must show that defendants acted with
"severe recklessness"); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
that to plead scienter, plaintiffs must allege facts "giving rise to a strong inference of recklessness"
and cannot rest solely on allegations of "motive and opportunity"); Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp.,
166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[A] plaintiff must either (a) allege facts to show that 'defendants
had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud' or (b) allege facts that 'constitute strong circum-
stantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness."' (citation omitted)).
82. See SEC v. Rubera, 350 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Scienter may be established
by recklessness, defined as 'a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvi-
ous that the actor must have been aware of it."' (quoting Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d
1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990))).
83. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (1976).
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Reckless conduct is conduct that consists of a highly unreasonable act, or
omission, that is an "extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is ei-
ther known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it. '""
The Ninth Circuit standard is particularly relevant in light of the large num-
ber of backdating investigations occurring in Silicon Valley.
Although resolution of this issue will turn on the facts of each individual
case, it is logical to conclude that, at least with respect to large-scale prac-
tices, backdating or forward-dating is usually carried out with a state of
mind sufficient to meet the Ninth Circuit's recklessness standard. Backdat-
ing of option grants appears to be done for only one purpose-to grant in-
the-money options while making it appear as though the options were
granted at-the-money. At the very least, there is intent to deceive as to the
grant date of the option.
Again, we note the possibility of ministerial mistakes resulting in back-
dating. If such were truly the case, it would be difficult for the SEC to meet
the scienter requirement of a lOb-5 claim. One practice that may be prone to
mistake involves compensation committee approval of option grants by
unanimous written consent. Under Delaware corporate law, unanimous writ-
ten consents are effective on the date of the last signature.16 It is possible that
due to a variety of circumstances, the last signature may be obtained at a
date later than that recorded as the effective date of the consent. If the op-
tions are dated as of the date incorrectly recorded as the effective date of the
consent, backdating has occurred. In such circumstances, there may be no
intent to deceive, and the behavior, although negligent and misleading,
might not be reckless.
On the other hand, it is also possible that the practice of unanimous writ-
ten consents for committee approval of option grants could be subject to
abuse and used intentionally to perpetrate fraud. This practice underlies the
allegation of the SEC in the case against the executives of Comverse Tech-
nology, Inc.8' A best practice, in light of the propensity for error or the
possibility of fraud, would be for compensation committees to avoid use of
unanimous written consents for future approvals of option grants. At a
minimum, a telephonic or other meeting, with a fixed date, would be in or-
der.
The last element of a 1Ob-5 claim requires that the fraud was perpetrated
"by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
84. SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 2001).
85. Id. at 856 (quoting Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 (9th Cir.
1990)).
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(f) (2001) ("[Alny action required or permitted to be taken
at any meeting of the board of directors ... may be taken without a meeting if all members of the
board ... consent thereto in writing .... ").
87. See Complaint at 15, SEC v. Alexander, No. 1:06-CV-03844 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006).
1613June 2007]
1614 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:1597
the mails. 88 This element is easily satisfied. Section 402 of Regulation S-K
requires disclosure of executive compensation agreements. s9 "[F]iling with
the SEC ... satisf[ies] the jurisdictional means requirement."9
It is also possible that the board of directors might be implicated in the
dating games along with the officers who implemented the scheme. 9' Under
the federal securities laws, the definition of reckless conduct used by the
Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Dain Rauscher92 may implicate board members if
they knew or should have known about the misleading dating of option
grants. In the Brocade case, charges have been filed against the former Vice
President of Human Resources because she allegedly falsified documents in
furtherance of the scheme, and also against the former CFO because he al-
legedly knew of the scheme and did nothing to end it.93 In fact, according to
Howard v. Everex Systems, Inc., the recklessness standard may be met by
demonstrating that "red flags" existed, thereby casting doubt on the truth-
fulness or accuracy of representations.94 The Howard court held that there
was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that a director had the requisite
level of scienter when he signed financial statements misrepresenting the
company's financial condition despite possessing negative information
about its actual financial condition.95 Therefore, a board that approved back-
88. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5 (2006).
89. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2006).
90. SEC v. Todd, No. 03CV2230, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41182, at *9 (S.D. Cal. May 30,
2006). In addition to Rule lOb-5 violations, there are a number of other securities laws that are
likely implicated by dating games. For example, the elements of a claim of a violation of Section
17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006), are "essentially the same" as a Section 10(b)
claim. SEC v. C. Jones & Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (D. Colo. 2004). Similarly, Section
13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(5) (2000), may also be implicated by backdating
and forward-dating activities. Section 13(b)(5) is violated by "knowingly circumvent[ing] or know-
ingly fail[ing] to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify[ing] any
book, record or account described in paragraph (2) [of section 13(b)(5)]." Id. In the Brocade and
Comverse Technology cases currently pending, the defendants are alleged to have falsified docu-
ments and records of option grants, and by extension, financial records. See Complaint, SEC v.
Alexander, No. 1:06-CV-03844 (E.D.N.Y Aug. 9, 2006); Complaint at 8-9, SEC v. Reyes, No. 06-
4435 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2006). The defendants in the Brocade case are also alleged to have pro-
vided false information to the board of directors and to outside auditors in order to allow the scheme
to remain undetected. See Complaint, Reyes, No. 06-4435. There are also a number of reporting
provisions that may be violated by submitting financial statements that are false due to backdated
options. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2, .13a- 14, .12b-20, .13a-l, .13a-13, .13b2-1 (2006). Again, this
list is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.
91. "[A] director who has the requisite level of scienter and signs a fraudulent [form filed
with the SEC] can be liable as a primary violator of § 10(b) for making a false statement." Howard
v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 E3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Dwyer, 928
F. Supp. 1239, 1255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
92. 254 E3d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Reckless conduct is conduct that consists of a highly
unreasonable act, or omission, that is an 'extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it' ") (quoting Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914
F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990)).
93. Complaint at 2, SEC v. Reyes, No. 06-4435 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2006).
94. Howard, 228 F.3d at 1064.
95. Id.
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dating of grants, without making appropriate financial disclosures, would
also likely be liable for federal securities law violations.
The more difficult case will be where the board approved the option
grants but did not know that the executives were backdating or forward-
dating the grants. Here the question will be whether there was scienter under
federal securities laws. Without actual intent to defraud, the courts will need
to determine whether the behavior was deliberately reckless. They will
likely consider the existence of "red flags" indicating the practice of back-
dating or forward-dating by the executives and whether such indicators were
96
sufficiently obvious that the board should have been aware of the practice.
We note that the alleged fraud in the Brocade case seems to have been
instigated by the only member of the compensation committee." A best
practice may be to avoid utilizing the corporate law provision that permits
98
one-member committees, at least for executive compensation. Additional
committee members may help provide a check on self-serving behaviors of
one committee member. Additionally, the revised New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") corporate governance rules require the compensation committee
be made up entirely of independent directors to minimize conflict of interest
issues. 99
2. State Corporate Law Implications
In addition to violating federal securities laws, the dating games played
by corporate executives run contrary to their fiduciary duties to the corpora-
tion and to the shareholders. In general, corporate officers and directors owe
the corporation and the shareholders the fiduciary duties of care' °° andloyalty,' °' and intertwined with loyalty is the obligation to act in good
96. In the complaints filed to date against the executives of Brocade, the SEC has not
charged the board members (with the exception of Reyes, who served as chairman and CEO) with
any violations. See Complaint at 3, SEC v. Reyes, No. 06-4435 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2006). This is
likely because Reyes, the former CEO, was acting as the only member of the compensation commit-
tee and allegedly provided false information to the board. Id. at 6. However, it would seem that a
board that approves options with backdated grant dates may be liable if they should have known that
the grant dates were incorrect and did not make the required financial disclosures.
97. Id.
98. Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (Supp. 2004) ("[Elach committee [is to] consist of one
or more of the directors of the corporation.").
99. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05(a) (2004).
100. This duty goes back at least to the 1880s when articulated by the court in Hun v. Cary, 82
N.Y. 65, 70-74 (1880). See also, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, No. 411, 2006 Del. LEXIS 307, at *55-57
(Del. June 8, 2006); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 358 (Del. 1993); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820-21 (N.J. 1981);
Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate
Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17-25 (1989).
101. See, e.g., Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361; Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571
A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del.
1988); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510
(Del. 1939); In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70,
at *138 (June 4, 2004); Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Challenge of Company Stock
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faith.' °2 The duty of care requires officers and directors to act as a reasonable
person would act under similar circumstances, or at least to act without
gross negligence.' 3 Loyalty obligations require corporate officers and direc-
tors to act in the best interest of the corporation, not for self-interest.04 To
the extent executives engage in related-party transactions, they are protected
from liability only if they disclose such transactions and gain approval by an
independent committee of the board.' °5 When independent approval has not
been granted, the courts will review contested transactions against a stan-
dard of entire fairness.' 06 That is, the court will only approve the transaction
if it was entirely fair to both outcome and process. 0 7 Entire fairness is one of
the strictest standards of scrutiny employed by the Delaware courts.
Again, although the issues of fiduciary duty breach in any particular
case will turn on specific facts and circumstances, dating games are unlikely
to withstand the scrutiny of a fiduciary duty analysis. The clearest case ap-
pears to be against the executives who engaged in the backdating or
forward-dating practices. To the extent they manipulated option dates to
provide themselves with additional undisclosed compensation, they seem to
be in violation of their fiduciary duties. The manipulation would in most
cases have constituted an intentional misrepresentation of their compensa-
tion to the stockholders and a concomitant misrepresentation of the financial
health of the company. Intentional deception is not within the parameters of
fiduciary duties. 10
Transactions for Directors' Duty of Loyalty, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 437 (2006); Dana M. Muir &
Cindy A. Schipani, The Use of Efficient Market Hypothesis: Beyond SOX, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1941
(2007) [hereinafter Muir & Schipani, Efficient Market Hypothesis].
102. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, C.A. No. 93, 2006 (Del. Supr. November 6, 2006) (duty of good
faith is part of duty of loyalty); Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS, at * 138-45 (discussing
good faith and interplay with the duty of loyalty); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907
A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The good faith required of a corpo-
rate fiduciary includes not simply the duties of care and loyalty ... but all actions required by a true
faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.").
103. See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) (defining the degree of care required
as "that which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under similar circumstances");
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (adopting the Briggs standard);
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS § 4.01 (2005) (defining duty of care in terms of a reasonable person standard). But see
Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 364 (rejecting the reasonable person standard in favor of one requiring
gross negligence); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (confirming the view that director liability is predi-
cated upon concepts of gross negligence).
104. See sources cited supra, note 100.
105. Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 A.2d 557, 562 (Del. 1999); Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217,
225 n.21 (Del. 1999); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991); Muir & Schipani, Efficient
Market Hypothesis, supra note 101, at 1960.
106. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 562; Oberly, 592 A.2d at 466; Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del.
Ch. LEXIS, at *38; President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. Glancy, No. 18790 2003 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 25, at *69 (Mar. 21, 2003).
107. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 97 (Del. 2001); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983); Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS, at *36.
108. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) ("[Wihen directors communicate
publicly or directly with shareholders about corporate matters the sine qua non of directors' fiduci-
ary duty to shareholders is honesty.").
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These practices also implicate the duty of loyalty. The manipulation of
stock granting dates is analogous to the classic case of an executive person-
ally benefiting from a transaction at corporate expense. Back in 1939, the
Delaware Supreme Court, in the leading case of Guth v. Loft,'°9 made it clear
that fiduciaries may not personally profit at the expense at the company.
This duty was reiterated recently by the Delaware Chancery Court in In re
The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation."° In Walt Disney, the court also
stated that "one cannot act loyally as a corporate director by causing the
corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to obey.""'
Moreover, due to the direct conflicts of interest inherent in the backdat-
ing and forward-dating cases, an executive might need to be found to have
been "entirely fair" to the corporation to pass muster under loyalty stan-
dards. Stealth compensation is not fair to the corporation and seems to be
the type of self-dealing that the duty of loyalty was meant to prohibit. In the
famous case of Meinhard v. Salmon, Judge Cardozo articulated the often
quoted standard of behavior required of fiduciaries: "[a] trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of be-
havior.""'2 The behavior of the executives complicit to the backdating
practices appears to be nowhere near meeting this standard.
As with the claims of securities fraud, the clearest claims for breach of
fiduciary duty are against the executives engaged in backdating schemes. A
more difficult question concerns the potential liability of the board of direc-
tors. To the extent the board members were aware of the deception and did
nothing to disclose the practice, it would seem they violated their fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith as well. Although Delaware corpora-
tions are permitted by statute to limit or eliminate monetary liability of
directors through a provision in the corporation's articles of incorporation,"'
this exculpation provision applies only to acts committed without intentional
misconduct and to acts that do not otherwise violate the duty of loyalty or
the obligation of good faith. ' 4 Thus, to the extent that backdating practices
involve intentional misconduct or violate the duties of loyalty or good faith
of the board members, the exculpation provision of state corporation statutes
would be inapplicable to protect them from liability for fiduciary duty
breach.
We note, however, that decisions regarding executive compensation
plans are business decisions which in general would be protected by the
business judgment rule. The business judgment rule is a presumption that
business decisions are made in good faith and in the best interest of the cor-
109. 5 A.2d 503,510 (Del. 1939).
110. 907 A.2d 693.
Ill. Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 753 n.447.
112. 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928).




poration."' If the board wishes to increase executive compensation through
backdating or forward-dating options, this practice would seem to be within
its province, provided that the compensation plan is properly reported.
Courts generally do not second guess business decisions unless there is evi-
dence of bad faith or a conflict of interest. But, as discussed in Section II.A,
without disclosure backdating and forward-dating practices deceive share-
holders and result in misleading financial information in apparent violation
of federal securities laws. The business judgment rule would not apply to
acts of deception that violate the board's fiduciary duties towards the com-
pany and its shareholders.'
6
The more difficult case concerns claims that may be brought against di-
rectors who, although not aware that backdating was occurring, did not set
up systems to prevent it from occurring. The issue of fiduciary duty breach
for questions of oversight is an unresolved question in Delaware law. The
clearest pronouncement on the issue came from the Court of Chancery, in
dicta, in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation.'"7 In
Caremark, the court stated that "a director's obligation includes a duty to
attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting
system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists.""' The court further
stated that in order to show that the directors breached their duty of care, the
following would need to be shown:
[E]ither (1) that the directors knew or (2) should have known that the vio-
lations of law were occurring and, in either event, (3) that the directors
took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation, and
(4) that such failure proximately resulted in the losses complained of."9
Thus, under a Caremark analysis, the question for the noncomplicit direc-
tors would be whether they had attempted, in good faith, to set up an
appropriate reporting system, and whether they should have known that vio-• 120
lations of the law were occurring.
As noted above, boards should be looking closely for red flags that
might tip them off to backdating or forward-dating games. Given the wide-
spread nature of the current scandal, it is advisable that controls be instituted
to show a good faith effort to prevent these scandals from occurring. Two
115. E.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc.), 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del.
1995); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683
A.2d 1049, 1052-53 (Del. Ch. 1996); Bradley & Schipani, supra note 100, at 23.
116. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998).
117. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970-71 (Del. Ch. 1996).
118. Id. at 970.
119. Id. at 971.
120. In the recent Walt Disney case, the court appeared dismayed with the role the board
members played in approving the employment contract of the company president, but it did not find
their behavior so egregious as to result in liability. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,
907 A.2d 693, 760 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). However, in Walt Disney, there
was evidence presented that the board was informed of the issues, even though there was no sup-
porting documentation. Id. at 707. The backdating cases are different to the extent that the boards
may have been completely unaware of the practice.
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possible controls include avoiding approval of option grants by unanimous
written consent and avoiding one-person compensation committees.
In addition, it would be advisable for boards of directors to avoid con-
flicts of interest. Courts scrutinize more closely transactions that involve
conflicts of interest. 2 ' If conflicted interests exist between board members
and executives who have been granted backdated options, courts are likely
to look at the board with skepticism. 
22
B. Tax Issues
In order to understand the tax effects of backdating, we first provide a
brief overview of relevant tax rules regarding stock option compensation.
We then turn to the effects of backdating on taxation, which usually include
the loss of exemptions and an increased tax burden either on the executive
or on the company.
The primary section of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") that governs
taxation of executive stock options is section 422.123 For tax purposes, there
are two types of executive stock option plans: statutory incentive stock op-
tion plans ("ISOs") and nonstatutory stock option plans ("NSOs").'24 The
following table summarizes the differences between the two types of plans
in terms of taxation of option compensation.
121. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
122. The Wall Street Journal recently reported conflicts of interest coming to light in the
internal probe of stock options at United Health. James Bandler & Charles Forelle, Interested Par-
ties: In Internal Probes of Stock Options, Conflicts Abound, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2006, at Al.
123. I.R.C. § 422 (2000).





COMPARISON OF ISO AND NSO PLANS REGARDING TAXATION
Event Tax Consequences to Company/Executive
ISO NSO
Option grant No tax effects. No tax effects.
Option vesting No tax effects. No tax effects if the options are not in-the-money
when granted.*
Option exercise No tax effects. Executive pays ordinary income tax on the
difference between the stock price at the time of
exercise and the exercise price; the stock price at
this time becomes the basis for the executive.
Company can deduct the same amount as expense
for tax purposes.
Sale of stock The difference between The difference between the sale price and the basis
from exercise the sale price and exercise price is treated as capital gains and taxed
price is treated as capital accordingly. No tax effect for the company.
gains and taxed
accordingly.** No tax effect
for the company.
* In-the-money option grants that vest after January 1, 2005, are treated as deferred
compensation and are subject to § 409(A).
** If the long-term holding period requirements are satisfied, the capital gain is taxed at the
capital gain tax rate. If not, ordinary income tax rates apply.
In addition to the tax rules listed in the table, section 162(m) of the IRC
limits the executive compensation deduction for public companies to $1
million per year per executive for compensation paid to the top five most
highly compensated executive officers for proxy reporting purposes.125 Op-
tion compensation that satisfies certain criteria may be considered
"performance-based compensation" and as such, would be excluded from
the $1 million limit. Under section 162(m), the amount of stock option gains
will not be included within the $1 million deduction cap as long as the op-
tions are granted under a plan that has a per-person per-period limit on the
number of options that can be granted each year; the options are not in-the-
money when granted; an independent compensation committee grants them;
and there is shareholder approval of the plan.1
26
For a stock option to qualify as an ISO (and thus receive special tax
treatment under IRC section 421(a)), it must meet the requirements of sec-
tion 422 of the IRC when granted and at all times beginning from the grant
until its exercise. ,27The requirements include the following:
125. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000). In 1992, the SEC instituted a requirement that a firm's proxy
statement contain details of compensation for the Chief Executive Officer and the next four highest-
paid executives.
126. Id.
127. Id. § 422(a).
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* The option may be granted only to an employee who must exercise
the option while an employee or no later than three months after termination
of employment.
0 The option must be granted under a written plan document specify-
ing the total number of shares that may be issued and the employees who
are eligible to receive the options, and the plan must be approved by the
stockholders within twelve months before or after plan adoption.
* The option must be granted within ten years of the earlier of adop-
tion or shareholder approval, and the option must be exercisable only within
ten years of the grant. 128
* The option exercise price must equal or exceed the fair market
value of the underlying stock at the time of grant, i.e., the option cannot be
in-the-money.
• The aggregate fair market value (determined as of the grant date) of
stock bought by exercising ISOs that are exercisable for the first time cannot
exceed $100,000 in a calendar year. If aggregate fair market value exceeds
$100,000, IRC section 422(d) provides that such options are treated as non-
statutory options.
29
Thus, ISOs qualify for exemption under section 162(m).' 30 NSOs might
also qualify if they meet the requirements. Most executive stock options are
NSOs because, unlike ISOs, the gains received from these options by execu-
tives can be deducted as compensation expenses by the granting firms.
Another reason for the popularity of NSOs is their exemption from the
$100,000 limit mentioned above.
Now we turn to the effect of backdating on taxation. Because backdating
always seeks to obtain an exercise price lower than the stock price on the
grant date, backdated options will be in-the-money ("discounted"). For this
reason, backdating has three potential effects on taxation:
First, options originally classified as ISOs no longer meet the non-
discounting requirement. They should be classified as NSOs, with the result
that the executives who had exercised the options owe taxes at the ordinary
income tax rate at the time of exercise, as opposed to owing no taxes if the
options were classified as ISOs.
Second, options originally classified as NSOs and claimed as exempt to
the $1 million limit imposed by section 162(m)' 3' no longer qualify for the
exemption because they are in-the-money. The company owes taxes for
amounts by which the stock gains from the exercise of these options exceed
the $1 million limit.
128. The employee must not, at the time of the grant, own stock representing more than ten
percent of the voting power of all stock outstanding (including stock constructively owned through
attribution pursuant to Code section 424(d)), unless the option exercise price is at least 110% of the
fair market value and the option is not exercisable more than five years from the time of the grant.
129. I.R.C. § 422.




Third, options vesting on or after January 1, 2005, will now be in-the-
money, thereby violating section 409A and resulting in their being consid-
ered deferred compensation. 3 2 The executives are now subject to tax at the
time of vesting (instead of at exercise) and, in addition, subject to a penalty
tax of twenty percent of the compensation required to be included in gross
income, plus interest on underpayment.'33 The corporation may deduct the
income reported by the executive as a compensation expense.
C. Financial Reporting and Disclosure Issues
There have been major changes since the 1990s in the way companies
are required to account for option compensation for financial reporting pur-
poses. Therefore, it is useful to briefly review the history of option
accounting for financial reporting. Until the mid-1990s, option accounting
for financial reporting purposes (as opposed to tax-reporting purposes) was
done under the guidelines established by Accounting Principles Board Opin-
ion 25 ("APB 25"). '1 Under APB 25, options that were granted at-the-
money or out-of-the-money had no impact at all on any of the financial
statements. 3 If options were granted in-the-money, the difference between
the grant date stock price and the exercise price (called the intrinsic value of
the option) had to be treated as an expense and deducted from income. Spe-
cifically, the intrinsic value (aggregated over all option grants) was
amortized as a compensation expense evenly over the vesting period. " This
treatment lowered the reported income while creating two offsetting entries
in the balance sheet: a deferred tax asset equal to the lowered tax due to the
compensation expense and an offsetting increase in the shareholder equity.'37
In 1993, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") proposed
expensing employee stock options at their fair market value at the time of
the grant.'39 The proposal was so controversial that it received more than
1700 comment letters, most of which were opposed to mandatory expens-
ing. 39 The U.S. Senate proposed legislation in 1994 that would have blocked
the FASB from forcing expensing. The Senate ultimately passed a nonbind-
ing resolution that condemned the FASB proposal and threatened to revoke
the FASB's independence status. In response, FASB rescinded the manda-
132. I.R.C. § 409A (Supp. IV 2005).
133. Id.
134. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
BOARD OPINION No. 25, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES (1972).
135. Id.
136. Compensation expense was not adjusted for subsequent changes in the market price of
the underlying stock. Id.
137. Because no actual tax was paid at the time of the grant, a deferred tax asset was created.
138. See David Aboody, Market valuation of employee stock options, 22 J. ACCT. & ECON.
357, 357-58 (1996).
139. Patricia M. Dechow, Amy P. Hutton & Richard G. Sloan, Economic Consequences of
Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, 34 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 4 (1996).
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tory expensing requirement, instead requiring only that the fair market value
for the options be disclosed in the footnotes. 40 In 1995, FASB issued the
final standard, Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123
("SFAS 123")." It encouraged companies to treat the fair market value as
an expense at the time of the grant but allowed companies to report under
APB 25 rules so long as footnotes contained a pro forma presentation of
earnings as if SFAS 123 had been adopted. Initially, all companies contin-
ued to follow the APB 25 guidelines. In July 2002, several major companies
announced that they planned to expense the fair market value of option
grants as suggested by SFAS 123.
In 2003, FASB reversed its stance and unanimously voted to recommend
expensing the fair market value of the options at the time of the grant. Al-
though the draft proposal again caused widespread furor (close to 5000
comment letters on the draft and passage of a bill by the House of Represen-
tatives to limit expensing to options granted to the top five executives),'
42
FASB went ahead with the proposal and released SFAS 123R in December
of 2004.143 After a delay by the SEC, the accounting rules of SFAS 123R
became effective from the fiscal year starting December 15, 2005.
The APB 25 guidelines'" are the guidelines relevant to our discussion
because our sample period ends in 2004 when very few companies were
expensing options as per the SFAS 123 recommendations. Under these
guidelines, financial statements must be modified in the following manner
when backdating is discovered. The income statement must reflect the fact
that the backdated options were granted in-the-money, requiring that the
intrinsic value of the options be treated as compensation expense. This
modification will lower the reported income and increase the stockholders'
equity. If a company involved in backdating had been expensing its options
as suggested by SFAS 123 "' (or as required by SFAS 123R),'" there is not
likely to have been any effect on the financial statements because the com-
pany would have reported the value of the option using the backdated
exercise price.
What economic impact will this restatement have (over and above the
revelation that there was backdating) if option values are already disclosed
in the footnotes as per SFAS 123? If, prior to the revelation of backdating,
the analysts had assumed no backdating as they evaluated the values of
140. See Wayne Baliga, FASB revises position on stock options, 179 J. ACCT., Feb. 1995, at
18, 18.
141. Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, supra note 20; Paulette A. Ratliff, Reporting
Employee Stock Option Expenses: Is the Debate Over?, CPA J., Nov. 2005, at 38, 39.
142. The House of Representatives passed the Stock Option Accounting Reform Act, H.R.
3574, 108th Cong. (2004), on July 20, 2004 by a vote of 312 to 111. 105 Cong. Rec. H6022 (2004).
143. SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, supra note 36.
144. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
BOARD OPINION No. 25, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES (1972).
145. ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, supra note 20.
146. SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, supra note 36.
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stock option grants (especially to the top executives), they will now realize
that the company has in reality issued options of greater value to the execu-
tives. This realization will result in a lowering of the stock price.1
7
D. Incentive Issues
Economic theory recognizes that agents are effort-adverse and that re-
wards tied to performance are required to provide them the incentive to
supply effort.' s4 However, it has been argued recently that top executives
have captured the compensation process and have weakened the sensitivity
of pay to performance. 49 This decoupling of pay from performance has been
achieved through several means such as cash and bonus compensation
weakly correlated to performance, deferred compensation benefits, subsi-
dized loans, and other perks.
Backdating is yet another way executives can reduce the sensitivity of
pay to performance.5 By backdating, executives ensure some gains from
their options even if the stock price does not increase at all; still worse, they
can benefit even if the stock price falls. Although we will argue that a more
direct effect of backdating is the overstatement of the firm's value through
inflated earnings,' it can be argued that the value loss due to improper in-
centives can be substantially higher. With poor incentives, executives may
misallocate the firm's resources, which in turn can cause considerable loss
in value. The revelation of backdating practices also exposes to investors the
weak sensitivity of pay to performance and thus reduces their valuation of
the firm due to concerns about misallocation of resources.
In addition to incentive effects, the revelation of backdating may also
lower investors' perception of the ability of the firm's top executives. Able
managers have less need to resort to dubious practices such as backdating to
enhance their compensation and decouple it from performance. The loss of
confidence in executives' ability by the revelation of backdating practices
will also result in a reduction in stock price.
147. Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik show that the reporting of option grants in the footnotes as
required by SFAS 123 had a negative impact on the stock price, suggesting that the recognition of
the extent of options commitments does have an impact on stock price. David Aboody, Mary E.
Barth & Ron Kasznik, SFAS No. 123 Stock-Based Compensation Expense and Equity Market Val-
ues, 79 ACCT. REV. 251 (2004).
148. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). See also Bengt Holmstrom,
Moral hazard and observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979).
149. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5.
150. Holman Jenkins defends backdating as perfectly legitimate. He claims that it is merely
an attempt to pay executives an optimal wage. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Backdating Revisited, WALL
ST. J., July 12, 2006, at A17; Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., The "'Backdating " Witch Hunt, WALL ST. J.,
June 21, 2006, at A13. Boards could have easily achieved this task by simply increasing the number
of options paid. Lowering the exercise price either directly or through backdating alters the incentive
effects.
151. See infra Part lL.
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III. EVIDENCE ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DATING GAMES
Our goal in this Part is to estimate and compare the potential benefit to
executives from backdating to the loss incurred by investors by the disclo-
sure that the firms may have been involved in backdating. To do this, we use
a sample of firms identified in the media as being implicated in dating
games. Although most publicity has focused on backdating, it is not clear
whether these firms engaged in backdating or forward-dating, or both. For
simplicity, we will refer to these firms as being implicated in backdating.
The sample is obtained from a continuously updated list maintained by the
Wall Street Journal on its website. 52 As of September 13, 2006, it contained
eighty-nine firms which have been implicated in at least one of the follow-
ing three ways: (1) The firm itself has acknowledged backdating; (2) the
SEC has started a formal or informal investigation of the company; and (3)
the Justice Department has started an investigation of the company. Table
2 lists the companies in our sample.
152. Options Scorecard, supra note 10.
153. Id.
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TABLE 2
LIST OF COMPANIES REPORTEDLY IMPLICATED IN DATING GAMES
No. Company No. Company
1 Activision 46 KB Home
2 Affiliated Computer Services 47 KLA-Tencor
3 Affymetrix 48 Linear Technology
4 Alkermes 49 Macrovision
5 Altera 50 Marvell Technology Group
6 American Tower 51 Maxim Integrated Products
7 Amkor Technology 52 McAfee Inc.
8 Analog Devices 53 Meade Instruments
9 Apollo Group 54 Medarex
10 Apple Computer 55 Mercury Interactive
11 Applied Micro Circuits 56 Michaels Stores
12 Arthrocare 57 Monster Worldwide
13 Asyst Technologies 58 msystems
14 Atmel 59 Newpark Resources
15 Barnes & Noble 60 Nvidia
16 Blue Coat Systems 61 Nyflx
17 Boston Communications 62 Openwave Systems
18 Broadcom 63 Power Integrations
19 Brocade Communications Systems 64 Progress Software
20 Brooks Automation 65 Quest Software
21 CA 66 QuickLogic
22 Cablevision 67 Rambus
23 Caremark Rx 68 Redback Networks
24 CEC Entertainment 69 Renal Care
25 Ceradyne 70 Restoration Hardware
26 The Cheesecake Factory 71 RSA Security
27 Chordiant Software 72 SafeNet
28 Clorox 73 Sanmina-SCI
29 CNET Networks 74 Semtech
30 Computer Sciences 75 Sepracor
31 Comverse Technology 76 Sigma Designs
32 Corinthian Colleges 77 Stolt-Nielsen
33 Crown Castle International 78 Sycamore Networks
34 Cyberonics 79 Sysview Technology
35 Delta Petroleum 80 Take-Two Interactive Software
36 Endocare 81 THQ
37 Engineered Support Systems 82 Trident Microsystems
38 Equinix 83 UnitedHealth
39 Foundry Networks 84 Verint
40 F5 Networks 85 VeriSign
41 Home Depot 86 Vitesse Semiconductor
42 Intuit 87 Witness Systems
43 J2 Global 88 Xilinx
44 Jabil Circuit 89 Zoran
45 Juniper Networks
The firms in this table were those listed on the Wall Street Journal web site
as of September 13, 2006, as being implicated in options dating.
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We do not have complete information about the various option grants
that are under investigation and the dates they were awarded. Therefore, we
cannot precisely estimate the extent of stealth compensation obtained by
executives through backdating. Because our intent is to relate the executives'
collective gain from backdating to investors' loss from the revelation of
backdating, we need only estimate the order of magnitude of these gains.
We therefore obtain the order of magnitude of these gains by estimating an
upper bound of the stealth compensation for the period of 2000-2004 using
the assumption that all grants during this period were backdated whenever
backdating was profitable to the executive. We choose this period as it is
almost equally divided between pre-SOX and post-SOX regimes. We then
compare the executives' gains to the value loss incurred by investors when it
was learned that these firms have been implicated in backdating.
A. Characteristics of Implicated Firms and Their Grants
Table 3 provides a summary of the options granted by our sample of
firms between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2004. The option grants
data are obtained from a compilation of the filings made to the SEC to meet
the section 16(a) requirements of the Exchange Act, purchased from
Thompson Financial. The data contain all option grants by publicly traded
firms reported on Form 4. In line with section 403 of SOX, 5 4 the SEC
amended the disclosure rules for beneficiary ownership reports. Reports
filed under section 16(a) now require reporting electronically within two
business days of getting notification of the grant.'55 We applied two clean-
sing filters provided by Thompson to eliminate questionable data.' 156 We also
eliminated firms for which stock return data are not available in the CRSP
(Center for Research in Security Prices) database. The final sample contains
61,122 option grants from 80 of the 89 firms in our sample.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2000).
155. Id. § 78p(a)(2).
156. We eliminated all data with cleanse indicator codes of S and A. These data are identified
because they did not meet Thompson's collection requirements, or numerous data elements were




SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FIRMS IMPLICATED IN DATING GAMES
Average
Average Average reporting lag
Number of shares per Total shares Number of shares per (business
Period grants grant granted firms firm days)
Pre-SOX
2000 2,901 19,834 57,538,513 68 846,155 214.9
2001 12,263 9,221 113,080,401 68 1,662,947 133.0
1/1/2002- 10,106 7,490 75,688,960 61 1,240,803 101.9
8/28/2002
Total 25,270 9,747 246,307,874 130.0
Post-SOX
8/29/2002- 4,205 6,264 26,340,463 44 598,647 8.5
12/31/2002
2003 16,506 4,976 82,127,535 71 1,156,726 8.1
2004 15,141 4,319 65,401,181 73 895,907 4.6
Total 35,852 4,850 173,869,180 6.7
The table provides the summary statistics of option grants reported by in-
siders on Form 4 to meet disclosure requirements of section 16(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act and awarded from January 1, 2000, through
December 2004 by firms listed in Table 2. "Total shares granted" are the
shares that the insiders will receive upon exercise of the options. "Number
of firms" indicates the firms that awarded options. "Reporting lag" is the
number of business days between the grant date and the date on which the
SEC received the filing.
Table 3 reports separately characteristics of pre-SOX and post-SOX op-
tion grants. From Table 3 it can be seen that total option grants by these
firms peaked in 2002, the year SOX became effective. About 113 million
options were granted that year by these firms and the number has dropped in
subsequent years. The average grant size has also steadily declined over the
years. The average reporting lag of the grants before SOX was 130 days.
Not surprisingly, the two-day reporting requirement has considerably re-
duced the reporting lag after SOX.
Tables 4a and 4b breakdown the awards by firm size and executive type,
before and after SOX. In Panel A of these tables, firms are classified into
four groups based on their market capitalization at the beginning of the
grant year (less than $100 million, $100 million to $500 million, $500 mil-
lion to $3 billion, and greater than $3 billion). 57 It can be seen from both
tables that most of the implicated firms are in the two larger categories. The
157. The total number of firms in Tables 4a and 4b is greater than our sample size of 89 be-
cause some firms are included in more than one category as their market capitalizations change over
time.
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average market capitalization of the implicated companies, measured at the
beginning of the grant year, is about $4.2 billion."58 This result contrasts with
results of earlier research indicating that most firms involved in backdating
are smaller ones. 5 9 Although it is probably not surprising that the larger
firms are likely to be investigated first, it appears most of the firms likely to
be involved in this practice are yet to be implicated.
TABLE 4A
AWARD STRUCTURE AND REPORTING BEHAVIOR BY FIRM SIZE
AND SENIORITY OF EXECUTIVE -PRE-SOX
Panel A: By Firm Size
Average
Average Average Reporting
Underlying Underlying Average Lag
Market Number Shares Per Number Shares Per Total Shares Maturity (Business
Capitalization of Grants Grant of Firms Firm Granted (Years) Days)
< $100 million 229 11,407 7 373,176 2,612,230 10.0 125.4
Between $100 4,975 4,061 24 841,785 20,202,833 9.9 117.1
million and
$500 million
Between $500 6,855 9,145 37 1,694,212 62,685,856 9.7 120.8
and $3,000
million
> $3,000 13,211 12,172 40 4,020,174 160,806,955 9.6 139.6
million
Whole Sample 25,270 9,747 1 246,307,874 9.7 130.0
Panel B: By Seniority of Executive
Top 6,259 21,355 71 1,882,505 133,657,844 9.5 117.2
Executives
Other Officers 19,011 5,926 74 1,522,298 112,650,030 9.8 134.2
Whole Sample 25,270 9,747 246,307,874 9.7 130.0
158. As a benchmark, there were about 900 firms traded in U.S. stock exchanges with market
capitalization greater than $4.2 billion on October 13, 2006.




AWARD STRUCTURE AND REPORTING BEHAVIOR BY FIRM SIZE
AND SENIORITY OF EXECUTIVE-POST-SOX
Panel A: By firm size
Market Number Average Number Average Total shares Average Average
capitalization of grants underlying of firms underlying granted maturity reporting
shares per shares per (years) lag
grant firm (business
days)
<$100 million 3,218 2,586 9 924,461 8,320,145 10.0 3.1
Between $100 10,626 3,302 23 1,525,702 35,091,147 9.8 8.8
and $500
million
Between $500 14,095 5,923 36 2,319,139 83,489,013 9.5 8.1
and $3000
million I
> $3000 7,913 5,936 22 2,134,949 46,968,875 9.5 2.9
million
Whole sample 35,852 4,850 1173,869,180 9.7 6.7
Panel B: By seniority of executive
Top executives 8,332 10,106 71 1,186,016 84,207,152 9.6 6.7
Other officers 27,520 3,258 74 1,211,649 89,662,028 9.7 6.7
Whole sample 35,852 4,850 173,869,180 9.7 6.7
The sample includes grants reported by insiders of firms listed in Table 2
on Form 4 to meet the section 16(a) requirements of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934. The sample contains eighty of the eighty-nine firms in
Table 2 with daily returns available in the Center for Research in Security
Prices ("CRSP") database. Table 4a provides the data for the pre-SOX
sample of 25,270 grants, awarded from January 1, 2000, through August
28, 2002, while Table 4b provides the data for the post-SOX sample of
35,852 grants, awarded from August 29, 2002, through December 31,
2004. Panel A of each table reports the award sizes, average maturity, and
average reporting lag for different firm size groups as measured by the
market capitalization of the granting firm at the end of the year prior to the
grant year. "Total shares granted" are the shares that the insiders will re-
ceive upon exercise of the options. "Number of firms" indicates the firms
that awarded options. "Reporting lag" is the number of business days be-
tween the grant date and the date on which the SEC received the filing.
Panel B of each table provides the same data for top executives and others.
Top executives include those with the titles (on the grant date) of Chief
Executive Officers, Chairmen of the Board, Chief Financial Officers,
Presidents, and Officer-Directors.
Panel B of Tables 4a and 4b divides the sample on the basis of the insid-
ers' seniority, classifying those with the titles (on the grant date) of Chief
Executive Officers, Chairmen of the Board, Chief Financial Officers, Presi-
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dents, and Officer-Directors as "top executives," and separating this group
from all others in the sample. About twenty-five percent of the option grants
in our sample are to top executives. It can be seen that top executives are
given much bigger grants than other executives-about four times as much
on average.
B. Stock Price Behavior of Implicated Firms
Around Option Grant Dates
Figures 1 and 2 show the stock performance around the grant date for
our sample of firms. Data on stock market returns are obtained from the
CRSP database. Both figures show the cumulative mean raw returns from
ninety trading days prior to the reported grant date (date 0) to ninety days
after the grant date. Each option grant is treated as an observation in Figure
1-if a firm awards more than one grant on a given day, the return of that
firm will be counted more than once. By contrast, in Figure 2 each firm-
grant date is treated as an observation-regardless of the number of grants a
firm awards in a given day, the return of that firm is counted only once for
that day.
FIGURE I












The figure plots cumulative raw abnormal stock returns around the option
grant date (day 0) of eighty-nine firms listed on the Wall Street Journal
web site on September 13, 2006, as having been implicated in dating
games. The sample includes grants reported by insiders on Form 4 to meet
the section 16(a) requirements of the Exchange Act. The sample is limited
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to grants by firms with daily returns available in the CRSP database and
contains 61,122 grants awarded during the period from January 1, 2000,
through December 31, 2004, with 25,270 grants pre-SOX and 35,852
grants post-SOX. The observation unit is the individual grant. Event days
are trading days. Cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return is computed
as the difference between raw return and the return to an equally-weighted
index of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks.
FIGURE 2
STOCK RETURNS AROUND GRANT DATE OF STOCK OPTIONS
(OBSERVATION UNIT: FIRM-GRANTS)
15%




The figure plots cumulative raw abnormal stock returns around the option
grant date (day 0) of eighty-nine firms listed on the Wall Street Journal
web site on September 13, 2006, as having been implicated in dating
games. The sample includes grants reported by insiders on Form 4 to meet
the section 16(a) requirements of the Exchange Act. The sample is limited
to grants by firms with daily returns available in the CRSP database. The
observation unit is the firm-grant date: each grant date of a firm is treated
as an event. The sample contains 1273 firm-grant dates during the period
from January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2004, with 695 firm-grant
dates pre-SOX and 578 firm-grant dates post-SOX. Event days are trading
days. Cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return is computed as the dif-
ference between raw return and the return to an equally-weighted index of
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks.
If there is no manipulation, we should see no patterns on the grant date.
On some grant days stock prices will go up and on some grant days they
will go down, with no pattern on average. However, as we can see from the
figures, there is a very sharp V-shaped pattern around the grant date, with
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the trough of the V being on the grant date. This means that, on average, the
executives of these firms are receiving grants on the dates when the stock
price is the lowest compared to its price on the surrounding days. It is inter-
esting to note that the pattern persists even after SOX. Although the V-
pattern, especially before the grant day, is somewhat muted after SOX, the
rise for thirty days after the grant date is not that different from pre-SOX
numbers. This result is consistent with the conclusion of Narayanan and
Seyhun that SOX has not eliminated the practice.'60
A comparison between Figures 1 and 2 shows that the magnitudes of the
pre- and post-grant returns are greater when the grant is the observation unit.
For example, the twenty-day post-grant return in Figure 1 is about 15.9%
for pre-SOX grants and about 11% for post-SOX grants; the same numbers
in Figure 2 are 11.6% and 5.5%, respectively. These numbers suggest that
there is more backdating when more awards are made on a given day.
C. Estimates of Stealth Compensation from Backdating
As stated earlier, we do not have information regarding the grants being
investigated, whether they are being investigated for backdating or forward-
dating, or the number of days by which the grants were allegedly misdated.
Therefore, we will estimate the stealth compensation for the 2000-2004 pe-
riod under the assumption that all grants during this period were backdated
whenever backdating was profitable to executives. We estimate the stealth
compensation for different assumed days of backdating, ranging from five to
ninety business days. This gives us an upper bound of the stealth compensa-
tion from backdating.
In order to calculate the stealth compensation from backdating, we need
first to calculate the value of the options that executives in our sample firms
received during 2000-2004. We use the Black-Scholes formula to compute
option values.16' The formula needs six inputs: grant date stock price, exercise
price 9 f option, time to maturity of option, volatility of stock returns, the risk-
free rate, and dividend yield. We know the exercise price, the maturity of the
option, and the grant date from the executives' Form 4 filing. We obtain the
grant date stock price from CRSP. The volatility is estimated as the volatility
of stock returns during the ninety-day period before the grant date. A risk-free
rate of 5% is used. 1 2 We assume that the dividend yield is zero for all the
stocks in our sample.163 Using these inputs in the Black-Scholes formula, we
160. Narayanan & Seyhun, supra note 18, at 6.
161. SFAS 123R accepts the use of the Black-Scholes model to value executive stock options.
SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, supra note 36.
162. The ten-year Treasury bond yield has fluctuated between four percent and six percent
during 2000-2004.
163. Of the eighty-nine firms in the sample, only ten firms paid cash dividends during this
period. In only one of these ten cases did the dividend yield exceed 0.6%. Hence, the error from
ignoring dividends is negligible. In any case, since we are seeking an upper bound, ignoring cash
dividends of these ten firms has no material impact on our results.
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compute the value of each option and multiply it by the number of options
in each grant to obtain the value of each option grant.' 6"
TABLE 5
POTENTIAL STEALTH COMPENSATION FROM BACKDATING
Pre-SOX Post-SOX
Total value of options granted (millions) $6,555 $2,188
Average value of an option $16.84 $11.13
Number of grants 25,049 35,422
Average value of a grant $261,676 $61,757
Number of grant days 658 558
Average value of options granted by a firm per 9.96 $3.92
grant date (millions)
Fraction of grant dates on which backdating 64%-68% 60%/-70%
would have been profitable
Total benefit from potential backdating (millions) $64-$115 $27-$85
Average benefit from potential backdating on $147,353-$296,126 $81,014-$217:135
each grant date
Average benefit from potential backdating as a 1 .30%-3.96% 1.78%-6.45%
fraction of grant value
The sample includes grants reported by insiders of firms listed in Table 2
on Form 4 to meet the section 16(a) requirements of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934. The sample is limited to grants by firms with daily
returns available in the CRSP database and awarded from January 1, 2000,
through December 31, 2004, and grants for which exercise price and ma-
turity data are available. Options values are calculated using the Black-
Scholes formula. The potential benefit from backdating is calculated by as-
suming that backdating is resorted to whenever profitable. The range of
values given in the last four rows results from different assumed backdat-
ing periods: five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, and ninety business days.
The results of the option valuation are presented in Table 5. The table
shows stark differences in the value of options and option grants before and
after SOX. Although the total value of options granted prior to SOX was
$6,555 million it was only $2,188 million after SOX, even though the two
periods are approximately the same length. Moreover, although the average
value of a single grant was $261,676 prior to SOX, it dropped to $61,757
after SOX-less than 25% of the pre-SOX value. However, the value of op-
tions granted by a firm on a single grant date recorded only a 40% drop,
from $9.96 million to $3.92 million. These figures, combined with the re-
164. Because some entries for exercise price and maturity are missing in the Form 4 filings,
we are able to value only 25,049 grants on 658 grant days before SOX (compared to 25,270 grants
on 695 grant days in the whole sample), and 35,422 grants on 558 grant dates after SOX (compared
to 35,852 grants on 578 grant days in the whole sample).
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duction in average options per grant reported in Table 3, indicate that there
are fewer options being granted, but more executives are receiving grants. 
6
1
We compute an upper bound to the average benefit from potential back-
dating during our sample period as follows. We start by assuming that all
option grants are backdated if backdating will increase the value of the op-
tions, that is, if backdating will result in a lower exercise price. This will
happen only if the stock price has been rising up to the grant date. It is rea-
sonable to assume that backdating will result in the exercise price being
lowered by the same proportion as the drop in the stock price. An example
will clarify our calculation.
Suppose an at-the-money option grant in our sample has been backdated
by twenty business days. Let the stock price on the manager-reported grant
date be $10, which is also the reported exercise price. If it had not been
backdated, the exercise price would have been the stock price that prevailed
twenty days after the reported grant date, which was $12. This means the
stock return during the backdating period of twenty days was 20%. It also
means that the exercise price without backdating would have been 20%
greater than $10, here $12, to keep the options at-the-money. Therefore, we
can obtain the exercise price of the option in the absence of backdating by
increasing the reported exercise price by the stock return during the period
of backdating.
Because we do not know how many days the options were backdated,
we calculate the upper bound for different assumed backdating periods: five,
ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, and ninety business days. We assume there
was no backdating on a grant date if the stock return for an assumed back-
dating period following the grant date was negative, because backdating is
pointless if the stock price was falling after the reported grant date. The frac-
tion of reported grant dates that would have been beneficial to executives if
they were backdated ranged from 64% to 68% pre-SOX, depending on the
assumed backdating period. The range is similar in the post-SOX sample,
which ranged from 60% to 70%.166
As can be seen from Table 5, the upper bound of the average stealth
compensation to all executives of a firm on each grant date from potential
backdating ranged from $147,353 if backdated for five days to $296,126 if
backdated for ninety days in the pre-SOX sample. The upper bound of the
potential benefit ranged from $81,014 to $217,135 in the post-SOX sample.
This benefit is on average 1.30% to 3.96% of the value of the options the
executives received during the pre-SOX period and 1.78% to 6.45% for the
post-SOX period. In aggregate, the upper bound of the potential benefit
from backdating ranged from $64 million to $115 million during the pre-
SOX period from January 1, 2000, and $27 million to $85 million during the
165. Some of the drop in the value of a grant is explained by the reduction in the average
value of an individual option (the average option value has dropped from $16.84 to $11.53). The
drop in the average value of an individual option can be partly attributed to the drop in volatility
(from 88% pre-SOX to 63% post-SOX).




post-SOX period up to December 31, 2004. Taking the most optimistic es-
timate, the total aggregate potential benefit of $200 million between 2000
and 2004 translates to about $2.5 million per firm for the 80 firms for which
option valuation could be done. This averages to $0.5 million per year per
firm during this period.
D. Impact of Revelation of Backdating on Shareholder Value
Figure 3 shows the impact of the revelation of backdating on share-
holder value. This figure plots the cumulative market-adjusted average
return for ten days before and ten days after the announcement of backdat-
ing (day 0). We define the announcement date as the first day that at least
one of the following events is reported in the media: (1) a direct or indirect• 167
acknowledgement by the company that it has backdated options; (2) an
announcement that SEC is formally or informally investigating the firm for
backdating; or (3) an announcement that the Justice Department is investi-
gating the firm for backdating. The market-adjusted daily abnormal return
("AR") for each firm is computed for each day during the twenty-one-day
period of [-10, +10], where day 0 is the grant date, as follows:' 6'
ARi,, = (ri, - rmt ),
where r,, is the return to stock i for day t, and r,, is the with-dividend return
to Standard and Poor's 500 Index for day t. The individual stock ARs for
each event day are then averaged across all the stocks in our sample to ob-
tain an average AR for each event day. These ARs are then cumulated to
obtain the Cumulative Abnormal Return ("CAR") for each event day during
the twenty-one-day window. Stock price and Index data were obtained from
the Yahoo! Finance web site.1
69
167. An indirect acknowledgement includes such announcements as senior executives being
fired or put on administrative leave and the need to restate financial statements or take a charge. For
the purposes of this figure, we do not consider as an event any announcements by companies that
they are just investigating their option granting practices. Since the scandal broke, many companies
have announced that they will investigate their own option granting practices, so announcement of
self-investigations does not necessarily imply that there was anything wrong with their practices.
168. We measure returns ten days before the announcement date to account for any news
releases that we did not find and to capture the effect on stock prices of news leakages. We measure
returns ten days after the announcement date to capture the full effect of the announcement on stock
prices.
169. http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
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FIGURE 3
MARKET-ADJUSTED RETURNS AROUND ANNOUNCEMENT DATE
OF IMPLICATION IN DATING GAMES





The figure plots cumulative market-adjusted abnormal stock returns
around the announcement date that the firm is implicated in dating games
(day 0). The sample includes eighty-four public firms listed on the Wall
Street Journal web site on September 13, 2006, as having been implicated
in dating games. Event days are trading days. Cumulative market-adjusted
abnormal return is computed as the difference between raw return and the
return to the Standard and Poor's 500 index. The announcement date is the
earliest of one of the following three dates: (i) the date the firm acknowl-
edges backdating; (ii) the date it is first reported that the SEC is formally
or informally investigating the firm for irregularities in options dating; (iii)
the date it is first reported that the Justice Department is investigating the
firm for irregularities in options dating.
Figure 3 shows that over a twenty-one-day period surrounding the an-
nouncement date, the average cumulative abnormal return of the stock of the
firms implicated in backdating was about -7%.7o This implies that, adjusted
for market movements, the average drop in market capitalizations of these
firms was 7% on announcement of investigation by the SEC or the Justice
Department or acknowledgment of backdating by the company itself. The
median stock return over the twenty-one-day period was about -6%. Sixty-
three of the eighty-four firms in the sample record a negative CAR. Some
170. Of the eighty-nine firms in our sample, two were acquired by the time they were impli-
cated in backdating and a third company received an acquisition offer around the time it was
implicated. We could not obtain precise announcement dates for two firms. The final sample used
for Figure 3 therefore contains eighty-four firms.
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firms had dramatic cumulative market-adjusted drops: Vitesse Semiconduc-
tor dropped 58% and Quicklogic dropped 40%.
Interestingly, Figure 3 also shows that most of the stock price drop oc-
curs before the first public disclosure of the backdating accusations. About
6% of the total 7% drop occurs during the ten days prior to the first public
disclosure. This finding suggests that some insiders or hedge funds may be
receiving word of the likely filing of backdating complaints and either sell-
ing or shorting the stock in advance. Intense selling activity is likely to drive
the price down, as shown in Figure 3.
We also computed the value loss in the market capitalization of these
firms. The market capitalization of the firms was measured eleven days be-
fore the announcement date, just before the beginning of the measurement
period in Figure 3. By multiplying the market capitalization of each firm by
its cumulative abnormal return over the twenty-one-day measurement pe-
riod, we obtain an estimate of the value loss of each firm upon the
announcement that it is implicated in backdating. The average market capi-
talization at the beginning of the measurement period was about $6.3 billion
and the average value loss was about $389 million. Stockholders of each of
the ten biggest losers sustained a loss of $1 billion or more.
How does the value loss from being implicated in backdating compare
to the potential benefits from backdating? As we saw in Table 5, the upper
bound of the aggregate potential benefit for all firms in our sample from
backdating during the 2000-2004 period was $200 million. This figure was
obtained by assuming that all grants that benefit from backdating are back-
dated and that they are backdated for ninety days.' 7' This translates to less
than $2.5 million per firm in our sample during this period or $0.5 million
per year per firm. When compared to the $389 million average loss from
being implicated in backdating, the upper bound of the potential benefit of
$2.5 million is negligible (about 0.6% of the value loss). It appears that the
stockholders are paying a substantial price for managerial indiscretions of
rather small benefit to the executives of these firms. If outrage costs are
what make executives seek camouflaged compensation arrangements, with172
or without the approval of the board, it appears to be a poor trade-off. For
a benefit of about $500,000 a year to the executives, shareholders are being
put at risk to thq tune of $400 million.'73
171. The figures may be somewhat higher if we picked the best backdating period for each
firm-grant date.
172. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5.
173. One cannot help but compare this scenario with Martha Stewart's conviction for ob-
structing an investigation by the U.S. Attorney for an alleged gain of less than $50,000 from insider
trading. This figure was miniscule compared to her reported wealth, and resulted in a value loss of
about 40% to the stockholders of Martha Stewart OmniLiving during June 2002 when news sur-
faced of her questionable sale of ImClone stock.
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IV. REMEDIES
In this Part we propose some remedies to address not only dating games
such as backdating and forward-dating, but also practices such as timing or
springloading. For the purposes of this discussion, we define springloading
as the practice of scheduling an option grant just before a positive news re-
lease or just after a negative news release, or the practice of scheduling a
positive news release just after a scheduled grant date or a negative news
release just before a scheduled grant date.
One goal of SOX was to bring greater transparency into executive com-
pensation. The rule requiring executive options to be reported within two
days of the grant was clearly intended to achieve this.7 4 If this rule were
strictly adhered to, backdating would not be very profitable to the execu-
tives. Although this rule has reduced backdating practices, it has not fully
eliminated it. As reported in earlier research by Narayanan and Seyhun,1
75
about twenty percent of the grants were not reported on time, which allows
for potentially profitable backdating.
We note that the duly-authorized practice of backdating or forward-
dating by itself is not illegal. However, it is important that the compensation
process be an arms-length transaction between boards or compensation
committees and the executives being paid. Regulation needs to prevent the
executives from capturing the compensation process and executing an end
run around insider trading laws through springloading practices.
Traditionally, regulators have assumed that executive compensation is an
arms-length transaction. As a result of this view, any shares received through
executive compensation have been viewed differently than shares the execu-
tive purchased in the open market, and they are exempt from certain insider
trading rules. For instance, executives are exempt from the short-swing prof-
its rule under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act 176 when the shares are
obtained from option exercises, as long as options were awarded more than
six months ago. However, the backdating scandal is likely to change this
view.
First, shares acquired through option exercises should lose their exemp-
tion status with respect to section 16(b). This exemption enhances insiders'
ability to engage in profitable trading by using their special information. To
the extent managers influence important parameters of the compensation
packages, managers can influence vesting decisions, and therefore can in-
fluence timing of the option exercises. Consequently, it makes sense to treat
compensation-related shares as similar to open-market-purchased shares.
Second, some commentators have argued that springloading itself can be
viewed as a form of insider trading. 77 After all, in both situations, insiders
obtain undervalued shares as a result of their privileged information, either
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(2)(C) (Supp. I1 2005).
175. Narayanan & Seyhun, supra note 7, at 15.
176. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (2006).
177. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835 (2004).
1639June 20071
Michigan Law Review
through an option award by the company (springloading) or open-market pur-
chase of common shares (insider trading). The SEC should also promulgate
new rules regarding springloading that bring the practice clearly and explicitly
under the definition of illegal insider trading. We believe these potential
changes will be quite effective in curtailing the practice of springloading.
The easiest way to limit clandestine backdating and forward-dating is to
require companies to report two critical dates: the date the board or compen-
sation committee finalized the option award details and the grant date as
decided by them. If these dates are the same, then any backdating or for-
ward-dating is not being authorized by the board, If the two dates are
different, then the board intended it to be so, and as long as all disclosure,
accounting, and tax requirements are met, it is legitimate; investors can de-
cide for themselves whether such compensation is optimal or not. Any
backdating or forward-dating from the board-approved grant date constitutes
deception.
The SEC voted on July 26, 2006, to approve a major overhaul of execu-
tive compensation disclosure rules. 78 The original proposal floated by the
SEC in January 2006 for comments did not contain any provisions aimed at
curbing nefarious dating games. It only required the disclosure of the grant
date. However, the July version included a provision requiring disclosure of
both the grant date and the decision date (the date the board or compensa-
tion committee finalized details of the compensation). In addition, the new
rules as proposed in July require disclosure of the grant date fair value and
the closing market price on the grant date if it is greater than the exercise
price of the award. Furthermore, if the exercise price of an option grant is
not the grant date closing market price per share, the rules require a descrip-
tion of the methodology for determining the exercise price. It appears that
the furor created during the early months of 2006 resulted in amendments to
the rules to curb clandestine dating games.
Although the above-mentioned rules will almost certainly eliminate
clandestine backdating or forward-dating, they do nothing to limit sprin-
gloading. Two additional remedies are needed to curb or eliminate
springloading.
First, annual option awards should not be effective on a single date. Sin-
gle annual awards increase the incentive to shift release of company-related
information to maximize the value of option grants. Instead, annual option
awards could be divided into twelve equal monthly installments and
awarded on a monthly basis at the same time executives receive their basic
pay. Spreading the awards throughout the year will eliminate the executives'
incentives to play springloading games. To give an example, if executives
announce some bad news before the February award, this will benefit the
February options by lowering their exercise price but hurt the previous
January options by pushing them out of the money. Similarly, shifting the
release of good news to a date after the February award will benefit the Feb-
178. 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249 (2006).
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ruary options by pushing these options into the money but will hurt the
value of March options by increasing their exercise price.
A second remedy for the springloading practice is to treat grants of
compensation options, as well as the acquisition of shares through exercises
of compensation options, as falling under the general insider trading provi-
sions of section 10(b). Just as insiders can be subject to civil and criminal
proceedings arising from timely purchase or sale of common shares, 7 9 this
remedy exposes insiders to civil or criminal liabilities if their option awards
also follow timely stock price patterns. Given the degree of influence insid-
ers have exerted over their compensation packages, this approach seems
reasonable. Ultimately, managers need to convince their shareholders that
they have earned their well-deserved compensation packages fairly by
creating wealth for them and not through manipulative means.
CONCLUSION
Recent research has established that many executives exert both legal
and illegal influence over their compensation. In this Article we focus
mostly on illegal means of influencing compensation. Illegal influence over
compensation has taken the form of clandestine backdating and forward-
dating option grants with or without the knowledge of the board. Sprin-
gloading falls into a gray area between legal and illegal practices. Many
executives have engaged in these practices to further increase the size of
their option awards. Illegal influence over compensation decisions raises
further issues related to civil and criminal liabilities, tax payments, corpo-
rate disclosure, and managerial incentives.
We also compare estimates of the size of the illegally obtained executive
compensation with the damage shareholders have suffered when these prac-
tices are disclosed. We estimate that the upper bound of managerial benefit
derived from these illegal practices averages about $2.5 million dollars per
firm over a five-year period. In contrast, when these practices become pub-
lic, the damages borne by the shareholders average about $400 million per
firm. Hence, our evidence suggests that managerial theft is not a zero-sum
game, but involves huge dead-weight losses for the shareholders.
Finally, we suggest various remedies to eliminate these practices.
Greater transparency with regard to the intent of the board through greater
disclosure is likely to control many forms of misdating. In addition, spread-
ing the option awards throughout the year and defining springloading to be
illegal insider trading is likely to curb most forms of illegal influence over
compensation.
179. Insider trading violations are prosecuted under Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000),
and Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006), discussed in Section I.A, supra. See also, e.g.,
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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